

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-11 L-03 ACDA-19

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-07 DODE-00 OMB-01 DRC-01 EB-11

COME-00 FRB-03 /148 W  
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R 171915Z JUL 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6791

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4254

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION BERLIN

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3949

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, XG, UR, FR

SUBJ: SAUVAGNARGUES VISIT TO USSR

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

REF: USNATO 3922

SUMMARY: IN JULY 17 NAC, FRENCH PERMREP PROVIDED EXTENSIVE BRIEFING ON RESULTS OF SAUVAGNARGUES JUL 11-12 VISIT TO SOVIET UNION. FRANCO-SOVIET TALKS COVERED FULL RANGE OF BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL TOPICS WITH HEAVIEST EMPHASIS ON CSCE. IN LATTER AREA, SOVIET POSITION DID NOT GO BEYOND STANCE CURRENTLY TAKEN BY WARSAW PACT IN GENEVA.  
END SUMMARY

1. FRENCH PERMREP DE ROSE FOLLOWED UP HIS REMARKS ON SUBJECT IN JUL 16

PERMREPS LUNCH WITH A  
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MORE DETAILED BRIEFING IN THE JULY 17 NAC AS FOLLOWS:

A. CSCE

1. WHILE RECOGNIZING THE WORK CARRIED OUT IN GENEVA, BREZHNEV COMPLAINED THAT CSCE HAD NOT YET BROUGHT POSITIVE RESULTS. NOT ONLY WAS THERE A TENDENCY TO CONFUSE THE ESSENTIAL WITH THE NON-ESSENTIAL, BUT CERTAIN FORCES WERE ATTEMPTING TO BLOCK PROGRESS. BREZHNEV DID NOT SPARE FRANCE IN THIS CRITICISM PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO BASKET III. BREZHNEV HAD ALSO SWORN SOVIET VIGILANCE AGAINST THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH ADOPTION OF CERTAIN MEASURES IN BASKET III MIGHT BRING TO SMALLER COUNTRIES LIKE BULGARIA, HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. WHY, HE ASKED, SHOULD DECISIONS BE MADE IN A MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK WHICH MIGHT BETTER BE MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF "LITTLE STEPS" AT THE BILATERAL LEVEL? SAUVAGNARGUES REPLIED THAT THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT THE GOVERNMENTS HAD ASKED OF

CSCE IN THE HELSINKI MANDATE. THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO IMPOSE ON THE USSR MEASURES WHICH IT CONSIDERED INCOMPATIBLE WITH ITS SOVEREIGNTY. HOWEVER, IT WAS DESIRABLE THAT THE INTENTIONS STATED FOR BASKET III BE BACKED UP BY SOME CONCRETE MEASURES.

2. IN HIS DISCUSSIONS ON CSCE WITH GROMYKO, SAUVAGNARGUES STRESSED THE NEED FOR SEEING THAT THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES DOES NOT DETRACT FROM THE RIGHTS ESTABLISHED IN THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS ON BERLIN AND IN THE TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF 1972. GROMYKO BASICALLY AGREED, AND SUGGESTED SEVERAL FORMULATIONS-ONE OF WHICH EVEN CONTAINED EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO FOUR-POWER RIGHTS. IN ANY EVENT, HE SEEMED COMPLETELY OPEN TO ADOPTION OF A TEXT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE POINTS OF INTEREST TO THE WEST ON THIS SUBJECT. GROMYKO ALSO INSISTED THAT THE CLAUSE EXCEPTING PRIOR TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS BE SEPARATED FROM THE PRINCIPLE ON THE CARRYING OUT INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN GOOD FAITH. HE CLEARLY INDICATED THAT THIS INTEREST WAS PROMPTED BY A DESIRE NOT TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES CONFORMING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW WOULD ALONE BE EXCEPTED. HE EVEN SPECIFICALLY ALLEGED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE SUCH AN INTERPRETATION IF ONE CONSIDERED THE DIFFICULT CHARACTER OF EXISTING OBLIGATIONS FOR EXAMPLE THOSE BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST STATES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS.

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3. ON INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS, GROMYKO INDICATED THAT THIS PROBLEM WAS ALMOST RESOLVED. THERE REMAINED ONLY THE NEED TO FIND A PLACE FOR THE "FLOATING SENTENCE" ON PEACEFUL CHANGE. GROMYKO THOUGHT THIS PHRASE SHOULD BE INCLUDED WITH THE PRINCIPLE ON NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND EXPRESSED CATEGORICAL OPPOSITION TO PLACING IT WITH THE PRINCIPLE ON TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

4. ON LINKAGE BETWEEN PRINCIPLES, GROMYKO WAS QUITE NEGATIVE. HE SAID THIS WAS AN ARTIFICIAL QUESTION, A "PERNICIOUS" IDEA WHICH DID NOT FIGURE IN THE UN CHARTER AND WHICH COULD UNDERMINE THE OVERALL EFFECT OF THE PRINCIPLES TO THE DEGREE THAT ONE PARTICIPANT COULD CHARGE THAT FAILURE BY ANOTHER STATE TO MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER ONE OF THE TEN PRINCIPLES PERMITTED THE FIRST

STATE TO

CONSIDER ITSELF NO LONGER BOUND BY THE OTHER PRINCIPLES. SAUVAGNARGUES RESPONDED THAT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL DID NOT PERMIT SUCH AN INTERPRETATION, BUT GROMYKO PLEADED FOR A FORMULA WHICH SIMPLY SAID THAT THE TEN PRINCIPLES HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE WHICH MUST BE APPLIED WITH EQUAL STRICTNESS. THE FRENCH MINISTER DID NOT HIDE THAT ONE OF THE PRINCIPLE FRENCH CONCERNS IN THIS REGARD, AND ONE WHICH WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR THE FRG, WAS TO AVOID THAT THE PRINCIPLE ON INVIOABIITY FRONTIERS BE GRANTED ANY PRIMACY OVER THE OTHER PRINCIPLES.

5. ON BASKET III, SAUVAGNARGUES STRESSED THE NEED FOR POSITIVE CONFERENCE REULTS IN THIS AREA WHICH MANY COUNTRIES CONSIDERED EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. GROMYKO WAS VERY NEGATIVE AND DECLARED THAT THE BEST SOLUTION FOR BASKET III WOULD BE TO CUT OUT THE BOTTOM OF THE BASKET SO THAT ALL OF THE CONTENTS COULD SPILL OUT. HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION COULD NEVER ACCEPT PROPOSALS CONTRARY TO ITS SOCIAL SYSTEM. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT CONCRETE STEPS IN THIS AREA BE TAKEN BY MEANS OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. MOREOVER, PRINCIPLES OF NONINTERFERENCE AS WELL AS EXISTING NATIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS MUST BE RESPECTED. ONLY ON THIS CONDITION COULD SOME DECLARATION OF INTENT BE ACCEPTED. SAUVAGNARGUES STRESSED THAT THE FRENCH HAD NO INTENTION OF PROPOSING ANYTHING THAT WAS OFFENSIVE OR NOT REALISTIC, BUT HE ASKED FOR DECLARATIONS OF INTENT WHICH WOULD EXPRESS THE HELSINKI GOALS, WHICH WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY PRACTICAL MEASURES AND WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT A PROCESS OF IMPROVEMENT HAD REALLY BEGUN. GROMYKO INSISTED THAT ALL OF THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE, AND THAT THERE WAS A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN CONFIDENTIAL

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CURRENT WESTERN PROPOSALS AND ASSERTIONS THAT ONLY NON-BINDING DECLARATIONS OF INTENT BE CONSIDERED. GROMYKO ALSO BRIEFLY REFERRED IN A RESERVED WAY TO THE NEUTRAL DRAFT ON THE BASKET III PREAMBLE. SAUVAGNARGUES DECLARED HIMSELF ASTONISHED BY THE SOVIET POSITION ON BASKET III WHICH MET PERHAPS ONLY A TENTH OF WHAT THE WEST CONSIDERED IMPORTANT. HAVING AGREED TO THE THIRD BASKET AT HELSINKI IT WAS NECESSARY TO ARRIVE AT SOMETHING CONCRETE IN ORDER TO CONCLUDE THE CONFERENCE SATISFACTORILY. BREZHNEV ECHOED GROMYKO'S VIEWS ON BASKET III. HE RECALLED THAT AT PIRSUNDA HE HAD EXPRESSED HIS ASTONISHMENT AT FRENCH PROPOSALS ON CULTURAL ACCESS. IT WAS UNTHINKABLE THAT NATIONS, RENOUNCING THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, COULD RECOGNIZE FOR OTHERS THE RIGHT TO PLANT ON THEIR TERRITORIES "ALL KINDS" OF CULTURAL AND INFORMATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. THE SOVIET UNION WAS STRONG ENOUGH TO ACCEPT THESE RISKS BUT, IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE THAT THE SMALLER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO SUCH TREATMENT. BREZHNEV'S BASIS POSITION WAS TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RESULTS ALREADY OBTAINED IN GENEVA AND TO URGE AN EARLY CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE. THE AMERICANS, HE SAID, THE GERMANS, THE CANADIANS, THE ITALIANS AND THE FRENCH WERE ALL IN AGREEMENT ON SUCH AN OBJECTIVE BUT STILL THE WORK HAD BEEN SLOWED DOWN BY CERTAIN FORCES WHICH RAISE

ARTIFICIAL QUESTIONS.

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NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-07 DODE-00 OMB-01 EB-11 COME-00

FRB-03 DRC-01 /148 W

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R 171915Z JUL 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6792

INFL ALL NATO CAPITALS 4255

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION BERLIN

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

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#### B. COMMON MARKET

1. SAUVAGNARGUES TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT FRANCE  
CONSIDERED THE BUILDING OF EUROPE ITS "PRIORITY OF PRIORITIES".  
TO THE DEGREE THAT THE STRENGTHENING OF THE EC LED TO GREATER  
INTERNATIONAL STABILITY THE SOVIETS COULD ONLY FIND THIS  
A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT HE PREFERRED  
NOT TO TAKE POSITIONS ON THE FINAL RESULT OF EFFORTS TO BUILD  
EUROPE SINCE THESE WERE NOT YET CLEAR TO HIM. SOVIET POLICY  
WAS "LENINST" AND THEREFORE "PEACEFUL". MOSCOW IS ALSO  
REALISTIC AND RECOGNIZES THE EXISTENCE OF THE COMMUNITY.  
THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT ONLY DONE NOTHING AGAINST THE COMMUNITY  
BUT INDEED IT HOPES FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN EC  
AND COMECON.

#### C. ATLANTIC DECLARATION

1. THE SOVIETS CONSIDER THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION A NEGATIVE  
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STEP BECAUSE IT SMACKED OF "MILITARIST" TENDENCIES. SAUVAGNARGUES  
REPLIED THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THE ALLIANCE DID NOT  
PROHIBIT THE DEVELOPMENT OF DETENTEM IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN

A CERTAIN EUROPEAN BALANCE AND THIS WAS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY FRANCE INTENDED TO REMAIN OUTSIDE MBFR WHICH HAD A ESTABILIZING CHARACTER.

D. NEAR EAST

1. BREZHNEV HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE USSR HAD BEEN LED TO ASSUME TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED STATES CERTAIN RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE REGION IN AN ATTEMPT TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT. HE WAS EVASIVE ON THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM.

E. CHINA

1. WHEN ASKED HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE CHINESE SITUATION, BREZHNEV REPLIED THAT THE CHINESE WERE THE PRISONERS OF THEIR INTERNAL STRUGGLES WHICH WERE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. THEY WERE ALSO ATTEMPTING TO SPREAD THE IDEA OF A THREAT FROM THE NORTH. FORMAL, INTERSTATE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA REMAIN NORMAL.

F. SOVIET INTERNAL SITUATION

1. BREZHNEV PAINTED A REASSURING PICTURE OF THE SITUATION IN THE USSR. SOVIET SOCIETY WAS UNITED AND INDUSTRY PROGRESSED; WHILE IN AGRICULTURE, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE BOTH ADVANCES AND SETBACKS ONE BALANCED THE OTHER. ONE PROBLEM WAS TO ASSURE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY WOULD BENEFIT EUROPE WHICH HAD ALREADY SHOWN ITS INTEREST IN THIS DEVELOPMENT.

G. FRANCO-SOVIET COOPERATION

1. BREZHNEV EXPRESSED HIS SATISFACTION AT GISCARD'S RE-AFFIRMATION OF FRANCO-SOVIET COOPERATION. HE REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH DEGAULLE AND POMPIDOU IN A WAY THAT SHOWED THE IMPORTANCE THE SOVIETS ATTACH TO THOSE AGREEMENTS. BREZHNEV SUGGESTED THAT POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION HAD NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED AND THIS COULD ALSO BE SAID OF COOPERATION ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL. RUMSFELD

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COOPERATION HAD NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED AND THIS COULD ALSO BE SAID OF COOPERATION ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL. RUMSFELD

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 11 JUN 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 17 JUL 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974ATO03949  
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**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
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**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740788/abbrywez.tel  
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**Office:** n/a  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** USNATO 3922  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 21 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <21 MAR 2002 by izenbei0>; APPROVED <13 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** SAUVAGNARGUES VISIT TO USSR  
**TAGS:** PFOR, NATO, XG, UR, FR  
**To:** STATE INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
GENEVA  
MOSCOW  
BERLIN  
MBFR VIENNA  
EC BRUSSELS  
**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005